Publications

The Euro-Atlantic institutional framework is the future of the Western Balkans. Or, at least, that has been the mantra in Brussels and Washington for the better part of the last two decades. European integration, arguably the more complex of the two undertakings, has been prominent in the international community’s engagement in the region. Both Slovenia and Croatia are now EU members, and Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia are each official candidate countries, with Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application underway. But what of the Atlantic half of the integration process?

Traditionally, a right to tax exists and is theoretically justified only after the basic human needs are met. Accordingly, fair taxation implies that the ones who have more wealth, pay more taxes, and thus finance state and public services such as security, education or healthcare.

In March 2016, two measures ended what has been labeled the European refugee crisis – the closure of the so-called Balkan route and the agreement on the EU-Turkey statement. The EU’s shift in policy put an end to the Eastern Mediterranean migration route into the EU, but it did not result in a complete closure of the Balkan route.

A positive characteristic of Serbia is the institutional and legal framework regarding digital economy and society. This has been reflected with the adoption of the new Law on Telecommunication and other digital services which are in accordance with EU regulations. The population of Serbia quickly and spontaneously accepts the latest information and communication technologies. The main weaknesses are echoed in the slow implementation of the Law, high Internet access costs and other issues.

Re-forging bonds between the countries of the Western Balkans (and southeastern Europe more broadly) has been an overarching issue and policy goal since the breakup of Yugoslavia. Regional cooperation has been the hallmark of EU policy since the signing of the Stability Pact in 1999. Various efforts since then (free trade, energy and transport infrastructure, the fight against corruption and organized crime, youth cooperation) have included both the Western Balkans states themselves and also the EU, the U.S., neighboring countries, and key international institutions and organizations.

In the aftermath of Brexit referendum and after the Paris Summit, it is of utmost importance to

reflect over the progress achieved so far in the framework of the Berlin process (BP), its place

in the myriad of existing regional cooperation initiatives and platforms and the challenges

ahead. Three years after its inception and one year before its end, it is time to take stock of its

dynamics and to contribute with contextualized recommendations on its role to further enhance

regional cooperation in the Western Balkans (WB6), and to its contribution to the EU accession

path of the WB6 countries.

A crisis of democratic legitimacy has been building up in Southeast Europe for years, despite the best efforts of democracy promoters from within and beyond the region. Led by the EU, the international community prescribed a model of democratic and economic transition in the aftermath of the Yugoslav Wars that they hoped would make the region both prosperous and stable. While significant progress has been achieved, informed observers understand also that Balkan leaders often pay mere lipservice to reform while actual democratic development is backsliding.

The democratic transition in Romania has been notably difficult. There are worrying signs that there is an authoritarian drift in society and the political system. If democracy is to last and be viable, Romania needs to rebuild its pluralistic and representative institutions. Will Romania join the nationalistic, conservative, and Eurosceptic Eastern bloc or will it be able to maintain its open, inclusive and pro-European perspective?